Working Papers
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Conference paper
Real vs. Imagined Financial Markets The Regulatory Challenge
Apr 2012
We have grown accustomed to regulating financial markets based on imagined, not real markets. Real markets are shaped by and co-evolve with institutional arrangements within two fundamental constraints: Imperfect knowledge and the threat of illiquidity.
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Conference paper
Finance and Growth: When Credit Helps, and When it Hinders
Apr 2012
The financial sector can support growth but it can also cause crisis. The present crisis has exposedgaps in economists’ understanding of this dual potential.
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Conference paper
Instability in Financial Markets: Sources and Remedies
Apr 2012
In the seemingly never-ending aftermath to the economic crisis that began in 2007, there is little disagreement that financial markets are characterized by instability rather than stability.
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Conference paper
Instability in Financial Markets: Sources and Remedies The View from Economic History
Apr 2012
Taking a long‐run view from economic history, I make three points about instability in financial markets. First, I argue that economic historians have a relatively good understanding of the proximate causes of financial crises.
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Conference paper
Inequality and Employment
Apr 2012
“Natural rate theory” has dominated interpretations of economic trends and policy prescriptions over many decades. European-type welfare state institution were claimed to cause a compressed wage distribution that distorts otherwise well functioning labor markets.
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Conference paper
Material intensity, productivity and economic growth
Apr 2012
Many models of economic growth exclude materials from the production function. Growing environmental pressures and resource prices suggest that this may be increasingly inappropriate.
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Conference paper
Does the Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus Depend on Economic Context?
Apr 2012
The topic of this session of the INET conference is a question: does the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stabilizing an economy depend on the underlying economic context in which the policy is implemented?
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Conference paper
Moving Towards Climate Justice: Overcoming Barriers to Change
Apr 2012
The present paradox, as ecological economist Bill Rees is fond of putting it, is simple yet profoundly troubling: “The ecologically necessary is politically infeasible, but the politically feasible is ecologically irrelevant.”
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Conference paper
Towards an Ecological Macroeconomics
Apr 2012
Three major crises are confronting the world. The first is the increasing and uneven burden of humans on the biosphere, and the observation that we have already surpassed the ‘safe operating space’ for humanity with respect to three planetary boundaries: climate change, the nitrogen cycle and biodiversity loss.
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Conference paper
Economics Needs to Treat The Economy as a Complex System
Apr 2012
The path to better understanding the economy requires treating the economy as the complex system that it really is. We need more realistic behavioral models, but even more important, we need to capture the most important components of the economy and their most important interactions, and make realistic models of institutions.
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Conference paper
Reconstructing Economics: Agent Based Models and Complexity
Apr 2012
In 1803 Louis Poinsot, a French physicist, wrote a book of great success, Elements de Statique, which was destined to have practical and social influences unimaginable to the same author.
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Conference paper
The Impact of Inequality on Macroeconomic Dynamics
Apr 2012
In the last few years the impact of income distribution on macroeconomic dynamics has received growing academic attention.
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Conference paper
Leveraging Inequality
Apr 2012
Long periods of unequal incomes spur borrowing from the rich, increasing the risk of major economic crises
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Conference paper
Unequal=Indebted
Apr 2012
Higher income inequality in developed countries is associated with higher domestic and foreign indebtedness
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Conference paper
Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation
Apr 2012
We analyze shareholders’ incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer.